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SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT v. RODRIGUEZ: ON OUR WAY
TO WHERE?
STEPHEN W. GARD*
The future of any country which is dependent on the
will and wisdom of its citizens is damaged, and irreparably
damaged, whenever any of its children is not educated to
the fullest extent of his capacity ....
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY'
INTRODUCTION
In recent years few subjects have aroused the interest and, in
many cases the wrath, of the American people so much as the judici-
ary's role in the affairs of the public schools. The United States
Supreme Court this past term rendered its most important decision
in the area since Brown v. Board of Education.2 In San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez3 the Court refused to over-
turn the Texas school financing system which makes the relative
wealth of the individual school district the basis for school funding
in that district - a system which results in gross inequalities.' By
so deciding, the Court rejected the Serrano5-type of school financing
challenge that had been endorsed by an unusually large number of
judicial scholars and had become something of a cause celebre for
many parents and educators.' Rodriguez was a landmark decision,
* Member of the Indiana Bar.
1. State of the Union Address, January 14, 1963.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
4. Id. at 15.
5. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
6. A long line of lower federal and state court decisions had held, contrary to Rodriguez,
that gross interdistrict disparities in public school financing violate the fourteenth amend-
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not because of what the Court did, but because of what it refused
to do.
Reaction to Rodriguez was immediate. In his dissent Mr. Jus-
tice Marshall succintly stated the reaction of many commentators:
[T]he majority's holding can only be seen as a retreat from
our historic commitment to equality of eduational oppor-
tunity and as unsupportable acquiescence in a system
which deprives children in their earliest years of the chance
to reach their full potential as citizens.7
As important as reasoned evaluation and scholarly criticism of
Rodriguez is, however, the most important question facing Ameri-
cans is "where do we go from here?" America is the land of oppor-
tunity, and it is beyond question that education is the essence of
opportunity. To be concerned with our nation's future, one must be
concerned with the birthright of every American child to an ade-
quate educational opportunity.
Following the Rodriguez decision, the first recommendation for
future judicial action came from Mr. John Coons, co-author of the
Serrano school financing challenge,' who suggested that the school
financing battle be continued in the state courts as a "kind of conso-
lation prize."' Doubtless, equality of school financing is an impor-
ment equal protection clause. See Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971);
Hollins v. Shofstall, Civil No. C-253652 (Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty., Ariz., July 7, 1972);
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Milliken v. Green,
389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), vacated, 42 U.S.L.W. 2327 (U.S. Dec. 25, 1973); Robin-
son v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972). See also Sweetwater County Planning
Commission v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971), juris. relin., 493 P.2d 1050 (Wyo. 1972).
But see McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd, mem. sub nom. 394 U.S.
222 (1970); Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (D. Va. 1069), aff'd mem. 397 U.S. 44
(1970).
In addition, legal scholars had virtually unanimously supported the Serrano-type of
school financing challenge. See, e.g., Bateman & Brown, Some Reflections on Serrano v.
Priest, 49 J. URBAN L. 701 (1972); Berke & Callahan, Serrano v. Priest: Milestone or Millstone
for School Finance, 21 J. PuB. L. 23 (1972); P. Ridenour, Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and
Kansas School Finance, 20 KAN. L. REv. 213 (1972); Vieira, Unequal Educational Expendi-
tures: Some Minority Views on Serrano v. Priest, 37 Mo. L. REV. 617 (1972).
7. 411 U.S. 1, 71 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see the statement of Mr. Justice
Powell for the Court majority: "Nothing this Court holds today in any way detracts from our
historic dedication to public education." Id. at 30.
8. J. COONS, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1972).
9. 216 THE NATION 556 (April 30, 1973). Mr. Coons in this short, highly critical article
on Rodriguez stated that the decision "poses clearly the unprecedented responsibility of state
judges to face the basic constitutional issues."
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tant constitutional issue, but it is certainly not the only
constitutional issue in the educational field. In this post-Rodriguez
era legal scholars must examine new means of assuring America's
children their right to an adequate education. The purpose of this
article is to spur consideration of judicial remedies to the educa-
tional crisis by suggesting one possible course of legal action. It is
imperative to note, however, that there are numerous potential
courses of action and never again should one theory be pursued to
the exclusion of all others.
EDUCATION-FAILURES OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM
In developing new legal approaches in the wake of Rodriguez,
one must first clearly define exactly what problem is being attacked:
Children are at once our most precious national re-
source and our most vulnerable minority. Education-and
for the overwhelming number of American children that
means public school education-is our best hope of devel-
oping that resource to its fullest potential. Education is
basic to the exercise of even those interests recognized by
the United States Supreme Court as so fundamental that
they constitutionally require special protection. Its in-
fringement is a denial of what Americans have always pro-
fessed to value most about the theory of our system: the
opportunity to begin adult life free of competitive disad-
vantage, save that of a wholly personal nature.'"
Thus the purpose and the duty of public schools is clear: to
educate the nation's children." Such a fact seems self-evident, but
an objective review of public schools indicates that such a duty to
educate is not clear to those in authority. Despite much fine oratory,
the public schools simply are not educating their children." This
10. Note, Equal Educational Opportunity: A Case for the Children, 46 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 280 (1971).
11. Butts, Assaults on a Great Idea, 216 THE NATION 553, 554 (April 30, 1973).
12. Thus, the following dismal account appeared recently in the Indianapolis News:
Fifteen to 20 per cent of the freshmen entering most city high schools are reading
below the fourth-grade level, high school principals told the Indianapolis School
Board in a discussion on discipline Tuesday.
The principals indicated to the board that reading failures are probably the No.
1 cause of discipline problems.
George Gale, principal of Northwest High School, said his school had more
academic failures this past grading period than ever before.
19731
4 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
situation was recently emphasized by Senator Walter Mondale of
Minnesota:
[E]veryone agrees that the present educational predica-
ment of poor children in America is a national disgrace and
a national scandal. Practically every test and survey we
have seen has demonstrated that these children by the mil-
lions are not learning the rudimentary skills, are not achiev-
ing. 13
The failure of public schools to educate has been documented by
numerous journalists, and every year more books appear explaining
why Johnny cannot read. 4 Nevertheless, Johnny still cannot read,
and there seems to be little headway towards solving the problem.
Perhaps one factor which inhibits significant progress is the
"We have more students who cannot read than we've ever had," Gale said. "In
a classroom situation this is very bad because the students can't keep up with what
is going on and they become bored and frustrated."
"We have remedial programs . . . but these people are below remedial pro-
grams. They are reading at the first and second-grade level."
"I'd say 20 per cent of the freshman class of about 600 students [are thus
deficient]." Gale answered.
Cloyd Julian, principal of Washington High School, estimated one out of seven
students in his freshman class reads below the fourth-grade level.
Julian said the school has remedial classes which are doing some good, but
added, "Many students have terrible attendance records and emotional problems,
and are not helped by the remedial program."
Earl Donaldson, principal of Attucks High School, estimated 15 per cent of his
freshmen have reading problems.
Ray Reed, principal of Tech, said, "If you've got money to spend on reading, it
ought to be spent in the elementary schools. We need to get at as many of the
problems as quickly as possible."
Reed said he spends about 85 per cent of his time in the schools dealing with
discipline problems. "Not only am I spending time in school dealing with them," he
added, "but I'm running into cars on the street because I'm thinking about them."
Indianapolis News, Nov. 1, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
The dismal record of public school administrators in failing to provide an adequate
education to their students gives credence to Samuel Clemens' classic observation, "In the
first place God made idiots; this was for practice; then he made school boards." TWAIN,
DICTIONARY OF HUMOROUS QUOTATIONS 203 (No. 59, Esar ed. 1949).
13. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare, United States Senate, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1972).
14. S. ENGLEMAN, PREVENTING FAILURE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1969); R. FLESCH, WHY
JOHNNY CAN'T READ AND WHAT YOU CAN Do ABoUr IT (1955); J. HOLT, How CHILDREN FAIL
(1967); C. WALCutrr, TOMORROW'S ILLITERATES: THE STATE OF READING INSTRUCTION TODAY
(1961).
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continuing tendency to view the problem as one affecting only poor
and black children. It is true that these children suffer most at the
hands of the schools.' 5 As a field representative for the National
Education Association has commented:
They [disadvantaged children] are relegated to the
arena of the untouchable, unteachable, undesirable, where
nothing is expected of them. People treat them as if they
are nothing, have nothing (including brains) and will
amount to nothing. Hence they end up with nothing-
having never really had a chance."
One school of thought widely disseminated by public school teach-
ers and administrators is that most students receive an adequate
education and those who do not are affected by circumstances or
personal defects beyond the control of the school. In at least one
well-documented instance, this line of thinking has been shown to
be pure myth.
The 1964 Haryou Report showed actual academic regression in
New York City's Harlem where "twenty-two per cent of the third
grade students in that area were reading above grade level, while
thirty per cent were reading below grade level . . . .By the sixth
grade twelve per cent were reading above grade level, and eighty-
one percent were reading below grade level."' 7 In conclusion the
Haryou Report found that the educational problems of these stu-
dents resulted in processes which occurred during the time they
were in school and not in processes found previous to their entry into
school.'8 In other words,
[tihe fact that the achievement deficit of these children is
cumulative and increases over time seems to reflect some
basic weakness in both curriculum and school practices for
these children. 9
15. See Senate Fact Finding Committee on Revenue and Taxation, California Senate,
State and Local Fiscal Relationships in Public Education in California (1965):
"The cities feed environmentally handicapped children into the school and the schools
feed uneducated young adults back into the cities." Id. at 59.
16. G. Jones, Compensatory Education for the Disadvantaged, NEA JOURNAL 22 (April
1, 1967).
17. NEW YORK: HARLEM YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES UNLIMITED, INC., YOUTH IN THE GHrro
168-70, 179 (1964). Results of other studies with similar findings are reported in R. HURLEY,
POVERTY AND MENTAL RETARDATION 262 (1969).
18. NEW YORK: HARLEM YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES UNLIMITED, INC., supra note 17 at 227.
19. S. SILVERMAN, COMPENSATORY EDUCATION FOR CULTURAL DEPRIVATION 74 (1965).
1973]
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There is danger, however, in considering a problem only from a
statistical point of view, for one does not see the human tragedies
behind, and buried within, the statistics.
"Lester B." is a recent dropout from an Indianapolis high
school.20 Lester entered the Indianapolis Public School system in
kindergarten and attended schools within that system continuously
until the tenth grade. Two years after he entered school, the system
gave Lester a Pinter- Cunningham Intelligence Test which indicated
that he was of average intelligence. Throughout Lester's "aca-
demic" career he was periodically graded by his teachers on his
personality traits, and never received less than a "C", indicating
average. His cheerfulness, cooperation, courtesy, dependability,
industry, punctuality, scholastic interest and study habits were al-
ways considered by his teachers to be average or above average. In
addition, there does not appear from his school records to have ever
been any problem with attendance.
Despite this history which would indicate no reason why Lester
was not continually ready, willing and able to benefit from what-
ever educational opportunity the schools had to offer, the record
nevertheless indicates that education was something denied Lester.
In the tenth grade, by the Indianapolis Public Schools' own records,
and on the basis of their own achievement tests, Lester had a read-
ing level of less than third grade.2 After ten years' attendance in the
Indianapolis Public School system, Lester left little better off than
when he began; he was a functional illiterate. Today he is unable
to get a job because he cannot read, and is not eligible for military
service. Perhaps as great a tragedy is the fact that neither Lester nor
his parents were ever informed of his academic shortcomings.,
Another example of the quality of education provided by the
Indianapolis Public School system is that of "Tom R." '23 According
to Indianapolis Public School records, Tom has an I.Q. of 76, and
20. In order to preserve this young man's human dignity and self-respect his true
identity will not be disclosed here. Further documentation will be made available to those
with a legitimate need therefor.
21. On the basis of the Wide Range Achievement Test for reading ability administered
by the Indianapolis Public Schools "Lester" scored on the second grade nine month level.
22. "Lester's" official school achievement record discloses that he was passed on to the
next grade at the end of each term and was never failed or retained in a grade. In addition
"Lester" was generally given "C's" in reading and only received three "D's" throughout his
academic career.
23. See note 20 supra.
[Vol. 8
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on that basis he was assigned to a special class for "slow" students
in which expectations are lowered and more rudimentary education
is provided. 4 Tom was independently tested by two private psychol-
ogists. One found that he had an I.Q. of 106, and the other found
that he had an I.Q. of 97.15 These tests also indicated that Tom, a
tenth grade student, was able to read on the fifth grade level, do
math on the fourth grade level, and spell on the third grade level.
These findings are corroborated by the school system's own records.
Tom, a young man with an extraordinary desire to learn, went
to the head of the English department after learning of his academic
deficiencies and requested remedial help. He was told that the
school had no such classes available to children reading above the
second grade level. Over Tom's protests, he was further informed
that he had no cause to complain since his reading ability was better
than the majority of students in his high school. This author person-
ally attempted to intervene on Tom's behalf with the school authori-
ties but met with a singular lack of success. After months of frustra-
24. In segretating students the IQ test is used as the principal grounds for
determining which students are "slow" (and should be made even slower) and which
are "fast" (and should therefore be given special advantages and removed from
contamination from other students).
P. SEXTON, EDUCATION AND INCOME 43 (1966).
Kenneth Clark, the noted social scientist, has remarked on the treatment of children like
"Tom" by the public schools:
When a child from a deprived background is treated as if he is uneducable
because he has a low test score, he becomes uneducable and the low test score is
thereby reinforced. If a child scores low on an intelligence test because he cannot read
and then is not taught to read because he has a low test score, then such a child is
being imprisoned in an iron circle and becomes the victim of an educational self-ful-
filling prophecy.
K. Clark, Educational Stimulation in Racially Disadvantaged Children, in EDUCATION IN
DEPRESSED AREAS 142, 150 (Passlow ed. 1963).
The situation is aggravated in the Indianapolis Public School System because of its
reliance on the Otis-Lennon Mental Ability Test. Indianapolis Public Schools, Response to
questionaire requested by Indianapolis Marion County Human Rights Commission, July 17,
1973 [hereinafter cited as Human Rights Commission questionairel. The Otis-Lennon Men-
tal Ability Test is widely recognized as being inappropriate for measuring innate learning
potential and the authors of the test themselves caution against results being accepted as
accurate for children who do not have normal backgrounds. THE SEVENTH MENTAL MEASURE-
MENTS YEARBOOK 690-93 (0. Buros ed. 1972).
25. On August 17, 1972 "Tom" was given extensive psychological tests by Dr. David
Blumenthal, Indianapolis, Indiana, and found to have a full scale IQ of 106. Shortly thereafter
similar tests were administered by Dr. David Lucas, Riley Children's Hospital, Indianapolis,
Indiana, who found that "Tom" had a full scale IQ of 97, thereby confirming that "Tom"
was a child of normal intelligence.
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tion and failure, Tom dropped out of public school and entered a
private remedial tutoring academy.
Lester and Tom are not isolated cases. At Shortridge High
School in Indianapolis, 40 per cent of the freshman class has only a
fourth, fifth or sixth grade reading level.26 The Indianapolis Public
Schools, as a matter of policy, refuse to release statistics of average
achievement levels, or otherwise to provide any objective indicia of
student academic accomplishment. 7
Thus, while it is necessary to consider the judicial remedies to
the educational crisis in somewhat abstract terms within the frame-
work of constitutional doctrine, we as lawyers and citizens must
remember Lester and Tom and the millions like them nationwide.
Any legal approach recommended must be tested by the degree to
which it will directly benefit these children. To do otherwise would
subject the schools to ineffective regulations which would only fur-
ther anger the American people by holding out more empty prom-
ises of a solution.
There are several specific practices and policies by which
schools deprive children of their educational opportunity. These
practices may vary from school to school and city to city, but on the
whole they appear to be widely used. The best known of these poli-
cies is the reckless and often discriminatory use of Intelligence (I.Q.)
Tests by the public schools. The results of these tests-frequently
biased by racial or ethnic background-are often used as the pri-
mary basis for placing a child in "slow" classes where he may re-
main for years. 2 The fact that the school system considers him
"slow" is often well known to the child. 29 Fortunately, the use of
26. The Indianapolis News, Feb. 19, 1973, at 4, col. 1. Even more disconcerting is the
revelation that students at Mapleton-Fall Creek Junior High School, a Shortridge High
School "feeder" school, have an average reading level of fifth-sixth grade. The Indianapolis
News, Feb. 21, 1973, at 4, col. 1.
27. On August 7, 1973, a request was made to the office of Mr. Paul Brown, Supervisor,
Testing and Evaluation, Indianapolis Public Schools, for official Indianapolis Public School
achievement test results. This request was refused. On August 30, 1973, a similar request was
made of Mr. Brown personally by certified letter. This writer has not been paid the courtesy
of a response to that letter.
28. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. Further, the report of public school
principals in a major metropolis recently declared: "There isn't too much we can do with our
children. Most of them are slow learners." HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, A
TASK FORCE STUDY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE DisTRIcT OF COLUMBIA AS IT RELATES TO THE
WAR ON POVERTY 64 (1966).
29. Human Rights Commission questionnaire. See also Green, Separate and Unequal
Again, 14 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 14 (1973).
[Vol. 8
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these tests is currently under attack in both California and Massa-
chusetts 30
Another widespread practice which operates to deprive children
of an education is that of "social promotion," a practice whereby a
child who fails to meet the required academic standards in one
grade is nonetheless promoted to a higher grade for "social" reasons.
Generally, physical size and sexual development are the explana-
tions given to justify this policy. The tragic effects on the children
are obvious, for "[a]s the child is 'promoted' from grade to grade
to keep him with his age mates but before he has really mastered
his tasks, failure becomes cumulative."3' Such a policy is utterly
senseless in a system like Indianapolis where a large number of
children are under-achieving and can be placed together in class-
rooms, not by age but by present educational needs.
Saddest of all in this situation is the fact that these very impor-
tant decisions affecting a child's life are not currently subject to the
due process requirements of notice, hearing, right to confrontation
and right to counsel." Before the school takes any significant action
concerning a child's educational career, it should have the responsi-
bility of notifying the parents of the specific nature of the child's
problem and presenting to them the results of the medical, psychol-
ogical or educational tests. The parents should also be fully in-
formed of the school's proposed educational plan for the child and
be periodically advised of how the child is progressing in terms of
the plan. Should the parents believe that the diagnosis is erroneous
or hopelessly biased, they must be entitled to a hearing before an
impartial arbitor where they may rebut the school's evidence and
present their own. While in many areas the schools have been re-
quired to observe the rudiments of the fourteenth amendment pro-
cedural due process guarantees,3 3 until they are recognized in this
30. Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (preliminary injunction is-
sued); Stewart v. Phillips, Civil No. 70-1199-F (D. Mass. 1971).
31. Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, N. deB. Katzenbach,
Chrm., in TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 51 (1967).
32. But see Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (consent order)
(public school students are entitled to a hearing before assignment to anything other than a
"regular" classroom). See also McClung, School Classification: Some Legal Approaches to
Labels, 14 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 17 (1973).
33. See, e.g., Scoville v. Board of Education of Joliet, 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970) (en
banc); Dixon v. Alabama, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); Knight v. Board of Education of New
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all-important area of classroom placement, an adequate education
will be very difficult, if not impossible, for many children to achieve.
One can also approach this problem of educational deprivation
from a broader point of view by looking at the resulting lack of
academic accomplishment suffered by children after years of public
school attendance. A legal challenge based on this approach is Doe
v. California School District.34 Peter Doe, the plaintiff in this suit,
is a nineteen year old graduate of Galileo Senior High School in San
Francisco who, despite good attendance and no handicap which
would impede his education, remains functionally illiterate; that is,
he has a reading achievement of approximately fifth grade level.
The suit is based on numerous common and state law theories of
action including negligence, fraud and breach of the statutory duty
to instruct public school students in the basic academic skills. 5
Challenges based on the United States Constitution generally
fall within this second approach to the problem," and it is this
approach to guaranteeing an adequate education which will be con-
sidered at length here. In order to consider intelligently the problem
of the right to an adequate education as a matter of constitutional
law, it is necessary not only to evaluate Rodriguez and its impact
but also to recognize the scope and force of the argument for the
recognition of a constitutional right to an education-a right seem-
ingly rejected in Rodriguez. It is only by consideration of the past
judicial treatment of the constitutional status of education that the
true meaning and relevance of Rodriguez can be understood and
placed in the proper perspective.
EDUCATION - CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES
The American belief in the fundamental importance of educa-
tion arrived with the first colonists on the Mayflower, and the first
York, 48 F.R.D. 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). See also Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of
Education, 293 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Tenn. 1968) (right to a hearing before public school
student can be denied the right to participate in school athletics).
34. Civil No. C-653 312 (Super. Ct. San Francisco, Cal., November 20, 1972).
35. Id.
36. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Van
Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp.
572 (W.D. Va. 1969); McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1969). See also Milliken
v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), vacated, 42 U.S.L.W. 2327 (U.S. Dec. 25, 1973);
Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584,
487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
[Vol. 8
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public school system in America was founded in Massachusetts in
1647.11 In 1787, two years before the Constitution was adopted, the
Confederate Congress declared in the Northwest Ordinance that
"[s]chools and the means of education shall forever be encour-
aged."38 Considering the fact that the Northwest Ordinance of 1787
was "one achievement of the Confederation it would be impossible
to question,"39 it is unthinkable that the omission of a specific guar-
antee of a right to education was intended by the founding fathers
to be a repudiation of the Ordinance. Clearly the omission of this
specific guarantee was due either to the belief that such a guarantee
was unnecessary because of the popular support and approval of the
Northwest Ordinance, or to the belief that such a right was assumed
to be within a broader, more general constitutional guarantee. This
point of view is buttressed further by the founding fathers' repeated
emphasis on the importance of education in the development and
maintenance of a democratic political system. Thomas Jefferson
firmly believed that public school education was the only "sure
foundation. . . for the preservation of freedom, happiness."40 With-
out education, Jefferson declared, "no republic can maintain itself
in strength."' George Washington also strongly believed in the im-
portance, indeed the necessity, of universal, effective public school
education:
Promote then as an object of primary importance Insti-
tutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion
as the structure of a government gives force to public opin-
ion, it is essential that public opinion be enlightened."
In addition to Washington and Jefferson, both James Madison and
37. W. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 138 (1954). On November 11, 1647, the Gen-
eral Court of Massachusetts Bay Colony ordered
that every township in this jurisdiction, after the Lord hath increased them to the
number of fifty householders, shall then forthwith appoint one within their town to
teach all such children as shall resort to him to write and read ...
Quoted in D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 300 (1958).
38. 1 U.S.C. XXXIX (1959).
39. E. WRIGHT, FABRIC OF FREEDOM: 1763-1800 160 (1961).
40. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Whyte, August 13, 1786, in 5 WRIrINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 396 (Berg. ed. 1907).
41. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Tyler, May 26, 1810, in 12 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 393 (Berg. ed. 1907).
42. George Washington, Farewell Address, in 35 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON
230 (Bicentennial ed. 1956).
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John Adams advocated governmental responsibility for free public
education. 3
Except for the temporary disruption of the Civil War, the nine-
teenth century was a chronology of progress for public school educa-
tion.44 An excellent illustration of the historical American commit-
ment to public education is the emphasis given to it during the
period immediately following the Civil War. The thirty-ninth Con-
gress, which drafted the fourteenth amendment, cited public educa-
tion as one of the fundamental tenets of Republicanism45 and public
education was imposed as a precondition for readmission to the
Union for confederate states. The importance which the founding
fathers placed on education is now reflected in the laws and consti-
tutions of every state except South Carolina (which repealed its
constitutional provision for free public education shortly after
Brown v. Board of Education was decided). 7 In addition, every state
except Mississippi (in a similar reaction to Brown) provides that
school attendance is compulsory."
43. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Samuel Chase, January 5, 1785, in 28
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 26 (Fitzpatrick ed. 1938); T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE
STATE OF VIRGINIA 146-49 (Peden ed. 1955); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Gilmer,
September 6, 1830, in THE COMPLETE MADISON 314-15 (Padover ed. 1953); J. Adams,
Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law in 3 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 455-56 (C. Adams ed.
1851).
44. See generally CUBBERLEY, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1934); EDWARDS
AND RICHEY, THE SCHOOL IN THE AMERICAN SOCIAL ORDER (1963).
45. See, e.g., Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173, 176 (1866); Act of March 2,
1867, ch. 158, 14 Stat. 434 (1867).
46. See Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 220-21 and n.9
(1948).
47. ALA. CONST. art. 14, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. 7, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. 11, § 11;
ARK. CONST. art. 14, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. 9, § 5; COLO. CONST. art. 9, § 2; CONN. CONST.
art. 8, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. 10, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. 12, § 1; GA. CONST. art. 8, § 2-6401;
HAWAII CONST. art. 9, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. 9, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. 10, § 1; IND. CONST. art.
8, § 1; IoWA CONST. art. 9, 1st, § 12; KANSAS CONST. art. 6, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; LA. CONST.
art. 12, § 1; ME. CONST. art. 8, § 1; MD. CONST. art. 8, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2;
MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. 8, § 1; MIss. CONST. art. 8, § 201; Mo. CONST.
art. 9, § l(a); MONT. CONST. art. 10, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. 7, § 6; NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 2;
N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 183; N.J. CONST. art. 8, § 4, 1; N.M. CONST. art. 12, § 1; N.Y.
CONST. art. 11, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. 9, § 2; N.D. CONST.art. 8, § 147; OHIO CONST. art. 6,
§ 3; OKLA. CONST. art. 13, § 1; ORE. CONST. art. 8, § 3; PA. CONST. art. 3, § 14; R.I. CONST.
art. 12, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. 8, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 3; TEX. CONST. art. 7, § 1; UTAH
CONST. art. 10, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 64; VA. CONST. art. 8, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. 9, § 1;
W. VA. CONST. art. 12, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. 10, § 3; Wvo. CONST. art. 7, § 1.
48. ALA. CODE tit. 52 § 297 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.010 (1966); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15-321 (Supp. 1972); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1502 (1960); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 12101
(West Supp. 1973); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 123-20-5 (1964); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-
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The existence of a right to education has long been recognized
by the judiciary; in fact, it has never been doubted. Traditionally
the right to an education has been found to be encompassed within
the "liberty" which the fourteenth amendment proclaims shall not
be deprived without due process of law.49 As early as 1923 the United
States Supreme Court, speaking of the substantive due process pro-
vision of the fourteenth amendment, stated, "[w]ithout doubt, it
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual . . . to acquire useful knowledge . . . ,, 0 This
construction is consistent with the intent of the framers of the four-
teenth amendment.5 '
The acceptance and recognition of the constitutional right to an
education by the United States Supreme Court is further continued
in the now famous school desegregation cases. In Brown I the Su-
preme Court unanimously held:
Today, education is perhaps the most important func-
tion of state and local governments. Compulsory school at-
tendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of edu-
cation to our democratic society. It is required in the per-
184 (1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14 § 2702 (Cum. Supp. 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.01
(Cum. Supp. 1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 32-2104 (Supp. 1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 298-9
(1968); IDAHO CODE § 33-202 (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122 § 26-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973);
IND. CODE § 20-8.1-3-17 (Cum. Supp. 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 299.1 (Cum. Supp. 1973);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1111 (1972); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.010 (1969); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:221 (Cum. Supp. 1973); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 911 (Cum. Supp. 1973); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 77, § 92 (Cum. Supp. 1971); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 76, § 2 (Cum. Supp. 1972);
MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 340.731 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.10 (Cunm. Supp. 1973);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 167.031 (1965); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 75-6303 (Cum. Supp. 1973);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-201 (1971); NEV. REV. STAT. § 392.040 (1971); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 193:1 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 77-10-2 (Supp.
1973); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3205 (McKinney 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-166 (CuM. Supp.
1971); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-01 (1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3321.04 (Baldwin 1971);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 10-105 (Cur. Supp. 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. § 339.010 (1972); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327 (Cum. Supp. 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-19-1 (1970); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 21-757 (Cum. Supp. 1971); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 13-27-1 (1967); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 49-1708 (1966); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.032 (1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-
24-1 (1970); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1121 (Cum. Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 22-255.1
(1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.27.010 (Supp. 1972); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-8-1 (1971);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 40.77 (1966); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21.1-48 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
49. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908); Johnson v. Town of Deerfield, 25 F.
Supp. 918 (D. Mass. 1939).
50. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
51. See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
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formance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship . . . . In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education. 2
Despite the confusion caused by the Supreme Court's use of Brown
I as authority for a series of rather summary per curiam decisions
invalidating racial segregation in numerous areas,53 a careful study
of the case clearly discloses that education, not race, was the pri-
mary grounds upon which the decision was based. That this is true
is apparent not only from the above-quoted language of the Court,
but also from the manner in which the Court phrased the question
presented in Brown I:
We come then to the question presented: Does segrega-
tion of children in public schools solely on the basis of race
• . .deprive the children of the minority group of equal
educational opportunities? 4
Thus, the precise issue with which the Court was concerned was
the constitutional mandate of equal educational opportunities, and
racial segregation was simply the factual situation which was al-
leged to result in the unconstitutional deprivation of an education.
If Brown I was simply a "race case"-as has been claimed by some
commentators-then the issues would probably have been framed
by a question like: "Does the denial of equal educational opportun-
ity deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws guaran-
52. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
53. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches and bath-
houses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (municipal golf courses); Gayle v. Browder,
352 U.S. 903 (1956) (de jure segregation of buses); New Orleans City Park Improv. Ass'n v.
Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (public parks and golf course); Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350
(1962) (segregation in airport restaurant required by administrative regulation); Johnson v.
Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (courtroom seating).
54. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See also Hearings before the Subcommittee on Education
of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1972) in which HEW Secretary Richardson stated:
We must reestablish by action . . .the primacy of the educational objectives
which underlie the original Brown cases .... The parents of all children - black
and white alike - are demanding more and better education from our school sys-
tems .... To put it another way, there is a belief abroad in the land that, in
enforcing the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, we have forgotten this basic
objective.
Id. at 26.
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teed by the fourteenth amendment?" This is the way in which issues
are phrased in other "race cases," in direct contrast to the phraseol-
ogy of Brown I. It is inconceivable that the issue in a lunch counter
segregation case would be phrased: "Does the segregation of lunch
counters deprive the plaintiffs of equal gastronomical opportuni-
ties?"
This interpretation of Brown I is further buttressed by Supreme
Court cases preceeding it. Both Sweatt v. Painter5 and McLaurin
v. Oklahoma State Regents,5 16 decided in 1950, outlawed racial dis-
crimination in specific educational situations on the grounds that
such discrimination resulted in denial of the constitutional right to
equal educational opportunity, and can only be understood in this
context. This interpretation of Brown I has also been adopted by the
Burger Court in Palmer v. Thompson,5" where the Court upheld the
closing of a municipal swimming pool to avoid integration, specifi-
cally distinguishing Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board5 (school
closing) on the grounds that public schools are the most important
function of state and local governments.
The lower federal courts have not been hesitant to follow the
Supreme Court's lead. Until Rodriguez the lower federal courts'
view of the constitutional right to an education can be summed up
by the District Court of Massachusetts in Ordway v. Hargraves:
It would seem beyond argument that the right to re-
ceive a public school education is a basic personal right or
liberty.59
Irrespective of historical considerations, in determining
whether public school education is a constitutional right, "[w]e
must consider public education in the light of its full development
and its present place in American life throughout the Nation." 0 In
55. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
56. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
57. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
58. 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. La. 1960).
59. 323 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (D. Mass. 1971). See also Cook v. Edwards, 341 F. Supp.
307, 310-11 (D.N.H. 1972)("No authority is needed for the fundamental American principle
that a public school education through high school is a basic right of all citizens."); Breen V.
Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969). Cf. Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866
(D.D.C. 1972) (consent order); Pennsylvania Ass'n Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334
F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (consent order); Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316 (D.V.I.
1970); Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Perry v. Grenada Munici-
pal Separate School District, 300 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
60. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
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addition to the historical acceptance of the constitutional right to
an education, there are other pressing reasons why an adequate
public school education is a constitutional requirement. Perhaps the
most fundamental of these reasons is that the right to an adequate
education is "preservative of other basic civil and political rights."',
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the relationship
between education and participation in the political processes of the
nation: "The public school is at once the symbol of our democracy
and the most persuasive means for promoting our common des-
tiny.""
Often the degree to which a citizen is able to communicate his
beliefs and desires to his government is directly dependent on his
ability to read and write. An illiterate citizen is at an overwhelming
disadvantage in protecting his rights and expressing his views,
whether in the courtroom, in an administrative hearing, or in a
simple letter to his elected representatives. The public schools, by
providing, or refusing to provide, rudimentary educational skills, in
fact determine the limits of an individual's ability to participate in
the political process.
Educational attainment is the most significant determinant of
political consciousness and participation. In 1959, Mr. Justice
Douglas, for the United States Supreme Court, held:
The ability to read and write likewise has some relation
to standards designed to promote intelligent use of the bal-
lot. . . .Literacy and intelligence are obviously not synon-
ymous. Illiterate people may be intelligent voters. Yet in
our society where newspapers, periodicals, books, and other
printed matter canvass and debate campaign issues, a
State might conclude that only those who are literate
should exercise the franchise . 3
61. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 370 (1886).
62. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring). See also Abbington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Americans regard the public schools as a most vital civic
institution for the preservation of the democratic system of government."); West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1943).
63. Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45, 51-52 (1959).
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Prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1965,4 nineteen states made liter-
acy a condition to the right to vote. 5 As the Court recognized in
Gaston County v. United States,"6 the causal relationship between
unequal educational opportunities and the right to vote was one of
the principal reasons for the Act's literacy test suspension provi-
sions."
Statistics on the 1968 Presidential election graphically illus-
trate this causal relationship between educational achievement and
participation in the electoral process:
REPORTED VOTER PARTICIPATION IN 1968
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION"
Proportion Voting
WHITES BLACKS
Years of Schooling Males Females Males Females
0 to 4 45.4 32.0 43.2 34.7
5 to 7 60.5 46.1 54.9 53.5
8 68.4 59.8 59.7 53.3
9 to ll 67.5 62.7 61.7 59.4
12 76.3 75.6 74.8 69.5
13 to 15 80.7 82.5 79.7 79.4
16 85.2 84.2 85.8 83.7
17 or more 86.4 88.3 88.4
These statistics are typical; virtually all studies have shown a strong
positive correlation between educational attainment and political
participation. 9 This relationship leads to the inevitable conclusion:
We are here dealing with an aspect of twentieth cen-
tury life so fundamental as to be fittingly considered the
cornerstone of a vibrant and viable republican form of de-
mocracy, such as we so proudly espouse, i.e., free and un-
restricted public education."
64. Act of Aug. 6, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
65. VOTING RIGHTS LEGISLATION, S. REP. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 45
(1965).
66. 395 U.S. 285 (1969).
67. Id. at 289.
68. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, YEARS OF SCHOOL COM-
PLETED - REPORTED VOTER PARTICIPATION IN 1968 AND 1964 FOR PERSONS 25 YEARS OLD AND
OVER, BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE UNITED STATES: NOVEMBER, 1968 (Current Population Re-
ports, Series P.20, No. 192, Table 11).
69. H. LEVIN, THE COSTS TO THE NATION OF INADEQUATE EDUCATION, COMMITTEE PRINT
OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
46-47 (1972).
70. Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316, 319 (D.V.I. 1970). See also THE PRESIDENT'S
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Like political participation, the meaningful exercise of rights
guaranteed under the first amendment rely on an adequate educa-
tion, for one of the primary purposes of public schools is
to nurture and develop the human potential of . . .chil-
dren . . . to expand their knowledge, broaden their respon-
sibilities, kindle their imagination, foster a spirit of free
inquiry, and increase their human understanding and toler-
ance.
71
The protection of the right to an adequate education is supported
by every consideration which has historically buttressed the first
amendment guarantee of free speech. The meaningful exercise of
the right of free speech is dependent upon the speaker's ability to
speak intelligently and knowledgeably, i.e., is dependent upon the
level of the speaker's educational achievement. The right of free
speech is meaningless unless the speaker is capable of articulating
his thoughts knowingly and persuasively. Education is speech, just
as speech is always a form of education. In our system "competition
in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral
process and of first amendment freedoms.""2
Education is the primary and deliberate influence of the state
upon the intellectual, social and political life of its citizens. The
denial of an adequate education constitutes a denial of the right to
receive information, a right whose constitutional protection has re-
peatedly been declared by the United States Supreme Court.7 3 The
right to receive information is so important that it was the basis for
the first invalidation of a federal statute on first amendment
grounds in the history of the Supreme Court. In Lamont v. Postmas-
ter General74 it was expressly held that the recipient of ideas, even
COMMISSION ON SCHOOL FINANCE, Schools, People and Money: The Need for Educational
Reform 13 (1972): "Literally, we cannot survive as a nation or as individuals without
[education]." Id.
71. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 239 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
72. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1969).
73. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (classroom described
as a unique example of the "marketplace of ideas"); Sweazy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 250 (1957) (Court upholds the right "to inquire, to study, and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding .. ."). See also Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dis-
trict, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
74. 381 U.S. 301 (1965). See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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unsolicited ideas and information, has a recognizable first amend-
ment right to receive such communication.75
Certainly a school child has an equal right to receive informa-
tion and ideas. Indeed, each state of the Union has created a multi-
million dollar information dissemination system which is justified
precisely by its specific and powerful influence upon its students'
minds. Indeed, this flow of information is deemed so important that
every state except Mississippi makes school attendance compul-
sory.76 When an adult has the constitutional right to enjoy obscene
materials, can a child have any less right to learn about reading,
writing, American history and the sciences? 7
Turning to the practicalities which mandate the effective pro-
tection of the constitutional right to an adequate education, it takes
little imagination to recognize the economic impact of education. In
our highly complex society, with its "nuclear physicists, ballet dan-
cers, computer programmers, [and] historians," formal training is
an absolute prerequisite to success." The impact of education upon
a child's future earnings capability clearly demonstrates the eco-
nomic necessity of an education. As of 1968, the lifetime mean in-
come of people with less than eight years of public education was
$196,000; for people with four years of high school, $350,000; and for
those with four years of college, $586,000.71 Indeed, the very oppor-
tunity of securing employment is dependent upon educational
achievement."0 As an extension of this thought, it cannot be dis-
puted that education, by enabling an individual to compete eco-
nomically on an equal basis regardless of socio-economic back-
ground, is essential to the maintenance of the free enterprise system
America prizes and thus is vital to the economic survival of the
nation in the world market place. In essence, the very survival of
the nation depends on the right to an adequate education.
75. 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965).
76. See note 48 supra.
77. Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
78. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 240 (1972) (White, J., concurring). See also, e.g.,
C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN BLACK AND WHITE 224-25 (1964); Note, Equal Educational Opportu-
nity: A Case for the Children, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 280 (1971); H. Mann, Twelfth Annual
Report to the Massachusetts State Board of Education, in COMMANGER, DOCUMENTS IN AMER-
CAN HISTORY 318 (1958).
79. 1972 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 114. This means that those with
less than eight years of education have an annual mean income of $3,981 while those with
four years of college have an annual mean income of $12,938. Id.
80. Piper v. Big Pine School District, 193 Cal. 664, 673, 226 P. 926, 930 (1924).
1973]
20 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Education is also a major factor in the reduction of the crime
rates.8 ' The relationship between inadequate education and juvenile
delinquency is readily apparent, and has been well documented.
One recent study found that children who received an inadequate
education were seven times more likely to become delinquent.82 The
old myth that many children have no interest in school and do not
want to learn has been totally repudiated; the fact is that virtually
all children place an exceedingly high value on educational achieve-
ment.8 Those children unable to achieve educationally become frus-
trated and develop a negative self-image. Rejection by teachers and
educationally successful schoolmates re-enforces this unfavorable
self-image. The frustration and bitterness becomes hostility-a
major cause of juvenile delinquency.84
That an adequate education is essential has been eloquently
stated by a United States District Court in the Virgin Islands:
[I]t is manifestly contrary to the public good . . . to de-
velop and foster a ghetto of ignorance, with countless num-
bers of untrained, untutored, and perhaps untended chil-
dren . . . roaming the streets, this with the concommitant
evils of crime, immorality and general social degeneracy. In
the public interest a generation of illiterates is to be
avoided, whatever the financial cost.8 5
If the constitutional right to an adequate education is not recog-
nized, if millions of children are banished to perpetual ignorance,
then the constitutional difficulties become even greater. Consider-
ing the irreparable injury an inadequate education inflicts on a child
and the fact that every state, except Mississippi, makes public
school attendance compulsory, then a serious eighth amendment
problem is presented:
81. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE TASK
FORCE REPORT, CRIME AND ITS IMPACT: AN ASSESSMENT 77-80 (1967).
82. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE TASK
FORCE REPORT, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 51 (1967).
83. Vinter & Sarri, Malperformance in the Public School: A Group Work Approach, 10
SOCIAL WORK 3-13 (1965); R. TURNER, THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF AMBmON 43 (1964).
84. K. Polk & L. Richmond, Those Who Fail (unpublished paper, Lane County Youth
Project, Eugene, Oregon) (1966); J.&M. TOBY, Low SCHOOL STATUS AS A PREDISPOSING FACTOR
IN SUBCULTURAL DELINQUENCY, (United States Office of Education, Cooperative Research Pro-
ject, No. 526, 1961); S. & E. GLUECK, DELINQUENTS IN THE MAKING 71 (1952).
85. Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316, 321 (D.V.I. 1970).
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To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the
altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane thera-
peutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment
violates the very fundamentals of due process."s
The eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment is not a static concept tied to eighteenth century standards,
"but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened
by a humane justice."" The rationale behind the "adequate treat-
ment" requirement of the eighth amendment is quite simple:
Adequate and effective treatment is constitutionally
required because, absent treatment, the hospital is trans-
formed into a penitentiary where one could be held indefi-
nitely .... *8
Clearly if confinement in a hospital without treatment violates
due process, then confinement in a school which fails to perform the
duty of educating is equally a violation. When the schools fail to
provide an adequate education they, due to the compulsory school
attendance laws, transform themselves into prisons and subject
their "students" to cruel and unusual punishment. Since the justifi-
cation for the compulsory school attendance laws is supported by
the concept of parens patriae, fourteenth amendment fundamental
fairness requires judicial intervention to assure that adequate edu-
cation is the quid pro quo for the public schools' right to exercise
parens patriae control and impose involuntary confinement for the
better part of a child's waking life. If the schools fail to provide an
adequate education, irrespective of whether a constitutional right to
an adequate education exists, then the involuntary confinement
becomes a clear deprivation of fourteenth amendment substantive
due process. 9
There can be no doubt that the Constitution protects against
86. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. i971). See also McNeil v.
Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 250 (1972) ("[D]ue process requires that the
nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relationship to the purpose for
which the individual is committed.").
87. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
88. Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
89. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Inmates of the Boys' Training
School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, (D.R.I. 1972); Kautter v. Reid, 183 F. Supp. 352 (D.D.C.
1960); White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954). See also In Re Harris, 2 Crim. L. Rep.
2412 (Cook Cty., Ill. Cir. Ct. Juv. Div. 1967).
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subtle as well as obvious deprivations of civil rights. Clearly few
cruelties are more insidious than the denial of an adequate educa-
tion, despite its subtlety:
The cruelty is a refined sort, much more comparable to the
Chinese water torture than to such crudities as breaking on
the wheel.'"
The United States Supreme Court has had a long and, until
Rodriguez, unbroken "love affair" with education and has consis-
tently emphasized the importance, indeed the essentiality, of an
adequate public school education." The lower federal courts have
not been hesitant to follow the Supreme Court's lead . 2 The import-
ance of a right to an adequate education for all children cannot and
must not be underestimated:
The children of today are the society of tomorrow. The
good society demands that their physical, mental, and
moral health be safeguarded. Nonsuccess in this task could
mean the end of the emergent process of the individual and
society. What is more, no single group of individuals may
be singled out for this safeguarding; otherwise, *the process
will be sorely inhibited. All children must participate, for
genius respects no single group or class. Jesus and Abraham
Lincoln both were sons of carpenters; Socrates' mother was
a midwife; Edison's father operated a small sawmill; and
Leonardo da Vinci was the bastard son of a housemaid. 3
90. Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 99 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aft'd, 456 F.2d 854 (6th
Cir. 1972).
91. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Surety and Casualty
Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Keyshian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Abbington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McCol-
lum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
92. See, e.g., Cook v. Edwards, 341 F. Supp. 307 (D.N.H. 1972); Mills v. Board of
Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (consent order); Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F.
Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971); Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316 (D.V.I. 1970); Van Dusartz
v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School
District, 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971). Cf. Pennsylvania Ass'n Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (D. Pa. 1971) (consent order); Alexander v. Thompson, 313
F. Supp. 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Perry v. Grenada Municipal Separate School District, 300
F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss. 1969). See also Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d
187 (1972); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
93. Swanson, "Equal" and "Equality" - An Economic Interpretation, 3 J. PUB. L. 47,
53 (1954).
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This then is the case for the continued recognition of the consti-
tutional right to an education, the judicial background against
which the claim of the plaintiffs in Rodriguez must be measured.
As has been shown, the constitutional right to an adequate educa-
tion is persuasive. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court
in Rodriguez stated flatly:
We have carefully considered each of the arguments
supportive of the District Court's finding that education is
a fundamental right or liberty, and have found those argu-
ments unpersuasive.?
Thus, any attempt to formulate a legal theory based on a right to
an adequate public school education must directly confront the
Court's resolution of the public school equal financing controversy
in Rodriguez."5
THE RODRIGUEZ CASE
In Rodriguez the plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of
school children in Texas who were members of minority groups or
who were poor and who resided in "property-tax poor" school dis-
tricts. 6 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they were deprived
of their right to equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment because of substantial inter-district dispari-
ties in per-pupil educational expenditures resulting primarily from
the impact of Texas' reliance on the property tax to finance public
education. In Texas, as in forty-nine other states which rely upon
the property tax to support public education, the financing of the
public schools is dependent upon the revenues that the particular
school district can collect. Thus, financing of each school district is
dependent upon two factors: its tax rate, and the amount of taxable
property within the district. 7 Naturally, the first factor depends to
some extent upon the degree to which voters in the district wish to
tax themselves to support public education.98 The second factor, the
94. 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
95. For a brief analysis of the evolution of the equal school financing challenge see note
127 infra and accompanying text.
96. 411 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
97. Id. at 73 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
98. Id. The taxpayers' desire to tax themselves is limited by Texas law which places a
ceiling upon the tax rate the district voters may impose upon themselves. Id. at 67 (White,
J., dissenting).
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amount of the taxable property, is a restriction upon the amount of
tax revenues which a district can raise to support its schools. Thus,
"[tlhe necessary effect of the Texas local property tax is, in short,
to favor property-rich districts and to disfavor property-poor
ones." The Edgewood Independent School District, in which the
appellees resided, was able to raise from all sources only $356 per
pupil, while Alamo Heights, the most affluent school district, was
able to raise $594 per pupil per year. 00
In attacking the Texas school financing structure, the appellees
relied on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
and sought to invoke strict scrutiny upon two grounds: first, that the
school financing structure discriminated on the basis of a suspect
classification-wealth, and secondly, that it infringed upon a fund-
amental interest-education. I0' The federal district court invoked
strict scrutiny and held unanimously that the Texas school financ-
ing system did, in fact, violate the fourteenth amendment equal
protection clause.'02 Moreover, the three-judge panel virtually char-
acterized the defense contentions as frivolous. 0 3
In reversing the decision of the district court and holding that
the system does not violate the fourteenth amendment equal protec-
tion clause, the United States Supreme Court, in a decision written
by Mr. Justice Powell, held not only that the Texas system does not
discriminate against any suspect class (in this case, poor people), 04
99. Id. at 74 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 12-13. This is true despite the fact that Edgewood Independent School
District had an equalized tax rate of $1.05 per $100 valuation while the property rich district,
Alamo Heights, had an equalized tax rate of $.85 per $100 valuation. Thus, Alamo Heights
was able to raise appreciably more revenue with which to support its schools with a lower
tax rate than was Edgewood District. Id. at 80 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 16.
102. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District, 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D.
Tex. 1971).
103. Indicative of the character of defendants' other arguments is the state-
ment that plaintiffs are calling for "socialized education." Education, like the postal
service, has been socialized, or publicly financed and operated almost from its origin.
Id. at 284.
104. 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). The intellectual honesty and principled use of precedent in
arriving at this conclusion is outside the scope of this article. Nevertheless, the reader is
invited to study the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall:
The Court rejects the District Court's finding of a correlation between poor
people and poor districts with the assertion that "there is reason to believe that the
poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest districts" in Texas. Ante
at 23. In support of its contention the Court offers absolutely no data - which it
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but also that education is not a fundamental right or liberty., 5
In so deciding, the Court was faced with each of the arguments
presented in this article for the recognition of education as a sub-
stantive constitutional right. How the Court dealt with, or refused
to deal with, these arguments, is the very essence of the problem of
whether education can still be recognized as a fundamental consti-
tutional right. In this regard it must be determined whether the
majority's analysis can withstand critical scrutiny and whether the
flat assertion of the Court that "[e]ducation of course, is not among
the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitu-
tion. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so pro-
tected," reflects the true holding of the case.' 6
The majority in Rodriguez began its analysis of education as a
cannot on this record - concerning the distribution of poor people in Texas to refute
the data introduced below by appellees; it relies instead on a recent law review note
concerned solely with the State of Connecticut, Note, A Statistical Analysis of the
School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L. J. 1303
(1972). Common sense suggests that the basis for drawing a demographic conclusion
with respect to a geographically large, urban-rural, industrial-agricultural State such
as Texas from a geographically small, densely populated, highly industrialized State
such as Connecticut is doubtful at best.
Finally, it cannot be ignored that the data introduced by appellees went unchal-
lenged in the District Court. The majority's willingness to permit appellants to liti-
gate the correctness of that data for the first time before this tribunal - where
effective response by appellees is impossible - is both unfair and judicially unsound.
Id. at 95 n.56 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. We have carefully considered each of the arguments supportive of the
District Court's finding that education is a fundamental right or liberty and have
found those arguments unpersuasive.
Id. at 37.
Although Rodriguez was concerned with education as a fundamental interest and this
Article is concerned with education as a fundamental right, the distinction is not important
here because even though, arguably, a fundamental interest does not have to be a constitu-
tional right, it is unquestionable that a substantive constitutional right is a fundamental
interest. See Id. at 100 n.59 and accompanying text (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Id.
at 33-34, where the majority states that the test it will use for determining whether an interest
is fundamental is whether it is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.
106. Id. at 35. Despite the majority's attempt to propound this revolutionary thesis as
established constitutional doctrine, the fact is that traditionally the determination of what
interests qualified for special protection was dependent upon two independent factors: (1)
whether the infringement of the interest causes irreparable injury, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942); or (2) whether the interest is preservative of other basic civil and
political rights, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). Thus, under the traditional
analysis, education should undoubtedly be classified as a "fundamental interest" because it
meets not just one, but both tests.
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fundamental right by stating, as a rule of constitutional law, that
the importance of a governmental service "does not determine
whether it must be regarded as fundamental."''07 In support of this
proposition, the majority cited Dandridge v. Williams. "I This cita-
tion is significant becaue Dandridge cited Shelton v. Tucker"°9 as
illustrative of the distinction between social and economic interests,
which are not entitled to recognition as fundamental interests," '
and interests, such as education, which are entitled to recognition
as fundamental because of the fact they are inextricably inter-
twined with freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Further-
more, the argument that the importance of a governmental service
is not determinative of whether an interest is constitutionally pro-
tected is, in this context, irrelevant. No one claims that education
is entitled to recognition as a constitutional right simply because of
its importance, but because it is essential to the rights and freedoms
the Constitution does recognize as fundamental.
Thus, the majority's opinion in Rodriguez must stand or fall on
its analysis of the relationship between education and those rights,
such as the right of free speech and the right to vote, which are
traditionally recognized as being constitutionally protected. The
Court accorded recognition to the relationship between education
and the right of free speech and the right to vote, and concluded
simply, "[w]e need not dispute . . . these propositions,""' thus
conceding that education is inextricably intertwined with the rights
of free speech and voting. Admitting the close relationship between
education and explicitly recognized constitutional rights, the Court
evaded the impact of this admission by the use of three techniques.
First, the majority stated, "[w]e have never presumed to pos-
sess either the ability or the authority to guarantee the citizenry the
most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice.""112 Pre-
sumably this statement relates to the appellant's assertion, ac-
cepted unquestioned by the Rodriguez majority, that the Texas
107. 411 U.S. at 30.
108. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
109. 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) ("The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.").
110. Included in this classification are welfare payments, Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970), and Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), and an adequate home and
shelter, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
111. 411U.S. at36.
112. Id.
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Minimum Foundation School Program assures "every child in every
school district an adequate education.""' In fact, the Court was so
impressed by the appellant's assertion that it was providing a mini-
mally adequate education to every child in the State of Texas that
this is cited no less than four times in the majority opinion, includ-
ing a lengthy explanation of the legislative history and functioning
of the Minimum Foundation School Program."' Accordingly, the
conclusion of the Court was that
no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to
provide each child with an opportunity 'to acquire the basic
minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of
speech and of full participation in the political process." 5
In this regard, it is important to recognize that the Court did
not rely on the assertion that education is not a fundamental consti-
tutional right but on the majority's position that if it is, the specific
facts of Rodriguez did not prove an infringement of that right. Pre-
sumably if the Minimum Foundation School Program did not as-
sure an adequate education, then the Court's decision might have
been radically different.
Second, the Court, on the basis that Texas was providing, or
at least endeavoring to provide, a basically adequate education to
all children in the State, relied on the proposition that a remedial
scheme should be gently examined and the greatest deference given
to the nature of the State's efforts to rectify an undesirable situa-
tion."6 Aside from differences of opinion as to whether the Texas
system is truly "remedial,""' 7 this rationale also goes to the issue of
whether, on the particular facts presented, the Court should find a
constitutional deprivation, and not to the more basic issue of
whether education is a constitutionally protected fundamental
right. No one questions the abstract constitutional principle that
when a State attempts to extend the benefits of a constitutional
right to citizens to whom it would otherwise be denied, the State
cannot be faulted for failing to "strike at all evils at the same time
''118
113. Id. at 24, quoting Appellants' Brief at 35; Reply Brief at 1.
114. Id. at 8-10, 17, 24.
115. Id. at 37.
116. Id. at 39.
117. See Id. at 81 n.35 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656-57 (1966) (extension of right to vote to
1973]
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Third, the Rodriguez Court relied on the belief that appellees
were engaging in a "direct attack on the way in which Texas has
chosen to raise and disburse state and local tax revenues" and that
the case presented "most persistent and difficult questions of educa-
tional policy.""' 9 Both of these factors led the majority to conclude
that the case was an appropriate one for judicial deference to the
legislature. 20 This rationale goes to the posture in which the issue
was presented to the Court, and not to the substantive determina-
tion of whether education is a constitutional right. It is entirely
possible that the right to an education could be asserted in a posture
which involves neither judicial determination of educational policy
nor the intrusion of the judiciary into the arena of taxation and
disbursement which have traditionally been matters of legislative
judgment involving local expertise.
Since the majority's disposition and rationale in no way relied
on a determination of whether there is a constitutional right to an
education, what is to be made of the isolated statement "Education,
of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under
our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is
implicitly so protected."' 2 ' Clearly the statement is pure dicta, but
even as dicta there is not a scintilla of support for its assertion.
First, it has never been thought that a right must be specifically
mentioned in the Constitution. The right to travel, although not
explicitly mentioned, has long been recognized as a fundamental
right because it is implicit in the underlying premises of the Consti-
tution. 2 2 Neither is the right to privacy afforded explicit protection
by the Constitution, but nevertheless has been consistently recog-
nized as a constitutional right.2 That the Constitution protects
rights not explicitly mentioned therein is the essence of our framers'
desire to set up a government of limited powers with all rights not
expressly granted by the Constitution retained by the people. This
persons to whom it would otherwise be lawfully denied).
119. 411 U.S. at 42.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 35.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966); Crandall v. Nevada,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 48 (1867). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
123. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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is the essential purpose of the ninth amendment,'24 and any decision
holding that only explicitly mentioned rights are entitled to consti-
tutional protection would in effect nullify the ninth amendment.
Second, the statement that the Court finds no basis for holding
that education is implicitly protected by the Constitution is in con-
tradiction to the text of the majority opinion. Not disputing the
propositions that education is bound up with the right of free speech
and the right to vote, the Rodriguez majority can only conclude, as
it did:
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quan-
tum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequis-
ite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no
indication that the present levels of educational expendi-
ture in Texas provide an education that falls short.' 5
So, Rodriguez must be read to hold that in this one particular case
there was no deprivation of the right to an education, not that
education is not a constitutionally protected right. 2 1
OUTPUT ANALYSIS
In determining a method of assuring an adequate education to
America's children, we must look to the origins of the school financ-
ing challenges which culminated in Rodriguez, for by examining
where we have been, we can see more clearly where we are going.
The initial school financing case was Mclnnis v. Shapiro in which
the plaintiffs contended that the fourteenth amendment required
that public school expenditures be made solely on the basis of the
students' educational needs. The district court rejected this argu-
ment on the basis that "educational needs" was such a nebulous
concept that it lacked judicially manageable standards, thus ren-
dering the controversy non-justiciable .121
After Mclnnis the architects of the school finance challenge
attempted to remedy this defect, and in the course of so doing the
124. The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
125. 411 U.S. at 36-37.
126. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall also suggests that this is the correct
interpretation of the majority opinion. Id. at 88.
127. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 329 n.4 and accompanying text (N.D. Ill.
1968), aff'd mem. sub nom. McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 222 (1970).
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theory became more and more removed from the true goal of achiev-
ing an adequate education for public school students and developed
into an increasingly irrelevant and sterile attempt simply to accom-
plish equality of school financing without reference to the relation-
ship between educational financing and the quality of education
provided by the schools. Thus the theory quickly became grounded
in an abstract right to an equal choice:
If money is inadequate to improve education, the residents
of poor districts should at least have an equal opportunity
to be disappointed by its failure.12
Therefore, in developing a realistic judicial solution to the problem
of inadequate public school education, we must return to the ap-
proach of McInnis and find a different method of remedying the
problems therein. McInnis, for all its flaws, was closer to the real
problem than the following cases, including Rodriguez.
One method of attacking the cruel and callous deprivation of
an adequate education by school systems, including the Indianapo-
lis Public School System, is to focus on educational output instead
of input as previous theories have done. Focusing on output-how
much the child has learned-has several inherent advantages.
First, as long as scholars and practitioners emphasize inputs, they
are going to be frustrated, for not only does such an approach re-
quire a correlation between the input and the quality of education
ultimately provided, i.e., output, but there are infinite inputs, in-
cluding funds, teachers, facilities, administrators and teaching
materials and methods. Each of these inputs is in itself complex and
involves numerous intangible factors. 12 The variety of inputs and
128. J. COONS, W. CLUNE, S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 30
(1970). See also 411 U.S. at 83-84 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
That the proponents of the equal school financing challenge were reduced to this conten-
tion was dictated by the fact that educational experts cannot agree on the significance of
variations in educational expenditures. Compare, e.g., J. COLEMAN, et al., EQUALITY OF EDU-
CATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 290-330 (1966); C. Jencks, The Coleman Report and the Conventional
Wisdom, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 69, 91-104 (F. Mosteller & D. Moyni-
han ed. 1972) with, e.g., J. GUTHERIE, G. KLEINDORFER, H. LEVIN & R. STOUT, SCHOOLS AND
INEQUALITY 79-90 (1971); S. Kiesling, Measuring a Local Government Service: A Study of
School Districts in New York State, 49 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 356 (1967).
In Hawaii, the only State with equal school financing, the schools produce results vir-
tually identical to those of the other States. TIME MAGAZINE 60 (June 11, 1973).
129. See, e.g., J. KoZOL, DEATH AT AN EARLY AGE: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HEARTS AND
MINDS OF NEGRO CHILDREN IN THE BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967).
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the seeming lack of any one comprehensive input which signifi-
cantly reflects all the others means that as long as the focus remains
on inputs, the battle for guaranteeing an adequate education for all
American children will be frustrated simply by overwhelming proof
problems and the inherent disabilities of attacking a problem piece-
meal.
Second, there is almost universal agreement among all who
have seriously considered the problem that quality of educational
opportunity must be measured by output, for "there is only one
important question to be asked about education: what do the chil-
dren learn?"'' 0 James Coleman, the recognized education expert,
urges that educational quality should be measured by output, and
his critics agree.'"' Perhaps the Committee for Economic Develop-
ment has stated the necessity for output analysis most cogently:
We insist that educational equality must be judged by
school "outputs," by the actual achievements of pupils in
intellectual skills, knowledge, creativity, and action. We
believe that the American people should refuse to settle for
anything less than universal literacy and those intellectual
skills which accompany literacy. Except for the less than
one per cent of any population group who are incapable of
normal learning, the schools should be expected and re-
quired to bring their pupils up to minimal standards of
intellectual achievement-not some of them, but all of
them. 31
In addition to the uniformity of academic enthusiasm for out-
put analysis, this approach has the benefit of building upon
Rodriguez and other legal precedent. In Rodriguez the Court sug-
gested that some minimum level of education was "enough" and
that the flaw with appellees' position was that there was no
allegation or proof that children in Edgewood Independent School
130. Messages to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States,
Education for the 1970's: Renewal and Reform 4 (1970).
131. See J. Coleman, The Concept of Equality of Educational Opportunity, 38 HAiv.
EDuc. REV. 7 (1968); F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan, A Pathbreaking Report, in ON EQUALITY
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 28 (1972); C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM 69 (1970). See
also Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and
Losing Wars, 81 YALE L. J. 1303, 1317 (1972); Note, Equal Protection in School Financing,
43 Miss. L. J. 266, 273 (1972).
132. COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, EDUCATION FOR THE URBAN DisADVAN-
TAGED: FROM PRESCHOOL TO EMPLOYMENT 13 (1971).
19731
32 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
District were not getting an adequate education.'3 3 Clearly implicit
in the Rodriguez rationale was the recognition that adequacy of
educational opportunity must be measured by output.34
There are, however, difficulties with any output analysis that
must be considered. Initially, the plaintiff must establish that he or
she is ready, willing and able to learn. The establishment of ability
to learn may very likely have to come from an independent, cultur-
ally non-biased psychological test rather than from reliance on the
schools' own evaluation-which may very well be biased and in
need of rebuttal.' 35 In establishing the plaintiff's willingness to
learn, existing school records may be of critical importance. Vir-
tually every school system "grades" its children on habits such as
cooperation, industry, punctuality, scholastic interest and study
habits as well as on attendance and disciplinary problems. At a
hearing, school personnel may testify that the student is unwilling
to learn-an unconscious effort by the persons involved to protect
themselves against blame for the failure of their students., 36 How-
ever, if school records reflect no behavior problems, they can be used
to refute such testimony. If matters to which school personnel later
testify were not worthy of action or note at the time they occurred,
they should not be considered important in determining the overall
ability and willingness of the student to learn.
A major difficulty with measuring educational opportunity by
output is that of developing a justiciable standard for measuring
output. Thus, before an output analysis can have any validity or
usefulness, a simple, easily ascertainable standard must be devel-
oped for measuring the quality of the education provided .by the
public schools. This was the initial problem with the school financ-
ing challenge: it was unable to develop a meaningful and ascertaina-
ble standard in order to meet the justiciability requirement of the
courts. "
There is, however, a standard which is simple, easily ascer-
133. See notes 112-15 supra and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., 411 U.S. at 88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
135. See notes 28-30 supra.
136. See, e.g., HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, A TASK FORCE STUDY OF THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AS IT RELATES TO THE WAR ON POVERTY 64 (1966);
J. KOZOL, DEATH AT AN EARLY AGE: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF NEGRO
CHILDREN IN THE BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967).
137. See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
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tainable, uniformly used by the schools themselves and accepted by
the courts. This is the standardized achievement tests, which have
been judicially described as the "most objective standard now in use
for measuring educational progress .. .. *"I" These standardized
achievement tests are widely recognized as authoritative. In fact,
the federal government uses these tests to measure the quality of
education provided by the public schools nationwide as well as to
measure the impact of federal education funds.3 9 The public school
systems have never in the past been hesitant to admit their reliance
on achievement test scores as a measurement not only of the stu-
dents' progress but also of their own performance. 4 ' Employers,
both public and private, also utilize standardized achievement tests
as criteria in determining whom to hire and for what positions.,
There are several advantages to a sound "output" analysis
which measures the quality of public school education objectively.
Initially, such an analysis is consistent with sound judicial princi-
ples. It has long been recognized on the one hand that "the court-
room is not the arena for debating issues of educational policy."''
On the other hand, "[tihe vigilant protection of constitutional free-
doms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools."'' 3 By simply looking to the results of the educational pro-
138. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 300 F. Supp. 1358, 1360
(W.D.N.C. 1969), aff'd, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See also Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver,
Colorado, 313 F. Supp. 61, 78-79 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd in part, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971);
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 460 (D.D.C. 1967).
139. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, THE EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF COMPENSATORY EDUCATION, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Education of the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 75 - 259
(1972).
140. Human Rights Commission Questionaire:
Results of the [standardized achievement] tests are used for three main purposes:
1. To help individual pupils - needs assessment.
2. To assist in developing plans within an elementary school building to meet the
needs of pupils.
3. General administrative use of the results in planning overall programs to meet
the needs of the school system as revealed in the test results.
141. See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR THE ADMISSION OF APPRENTICES ESTABLISHED BY THE JOINT
APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE AND TRUST FOR THE SHEgr METAL INDUSTRY OF NEW YORK CITY,
NEW YORK. PURSUANT TO THE "AGREEMENT" AND DECLARATION OF TRUST AND THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS ADOPTED THEREUNDER BY THE TRUSTEES (1964).
142. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940). See also Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
143. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960). See also West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1943); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401,
517 (D.D.C. 1967).
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cess, the courts can avoid becoming enmeshed in debates over edu-
cational policy, an area in which the judiciary lacks the necessary
specialized knowledge and expertise. The use of objective standard-
ized achievement tests to determine whether the public schools are
meeting their constitutional duty to provide an adequate education
reduces the courts' chore to the adjudication of a pure legal ques-
tion. Either the schools are meeting their constitutional duty or they
are not. At no point do the courts have to make policy judgments
between competing educational theories. These delicate matters are
left where they belong-to the public school administrators. In the
final analysis, under this theory, "[tihe burden on a school board
• . . is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to
work . . . ."I" Thus all the educational policy judgments are left
to the school administrators and only the final legal conclusion
whether the school has met its constitutional duty remains for the
courts' determination.
Another benefit of this theory is that it avoids the major pitfall
of Rodriguez and places the troublesome issues of public school
financing and expenditures in their proper perspective. Unlike
Rodriguez, in which the constitutional standard of equal educa-
tional opportunity was the method and measure of taxation and
expenditures, this theory relies on public school financing in no way
whatsoever. By focusing on educational output as measured by
standardized achievement test scores, this theory anticipates the
inevitable defense that will be raised by the public schools: inade-
quate funds. Since the theory itself places no reliance on school
financing, it can meet this defense by utilizing the "compelling
precedent that lack of funds is no defense where fundamental con-
stitutional rights are at stake."'' This proposition is especially true
where the constitutional right involved is education,'46 since "for
such purposes [education] the Government must raise the
funds."'47
144. Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
145. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
633 (1969).
146. See Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964); Knight v. Board of
Education, 48 F.R.D. 108, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp.
866 (D.D.C. 1972) (consent order); United States v. School District 151, 303 F. Supp. 201,
232 (N.D. Il. 1969).
147. Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316, 320 (D.V.I. 1970).
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CONCLUSION
Rodriguez must not be the end of judicial attempts to assure
America's children their birthright-an adequate education. After
Rodriguez numerous potential courses of action must be simultane-
ously and vigorously pursued. The theory presented here is sug-
gested as but one method of assuring "Tom R." and "Lester B." and
the hundreds of thousands of others like them that which society has
promised them for so long and has so cruelly denied them: a mini-
mally adequate education. "In short, our objective is-or should be
-quality, not equality."'48
148. P. Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Juris-
prudence Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 583, 591 (1968).

